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In this excellent book Brett Christophers offers an intriguing, historically-informed but 
partially inadequate response to a significant deficit in the regulationist analysis of 
political economy. Regulationists ask why, despite its inherent contradictions and 
crisis-tendencies, capital accumulation proceeds relatively smoothly for significant 
periods in specific spatio-temporal settings. They explain this through the trial-and-
error emergence and consolidation of specific growth regimes and corresponding 
modes of régulation-cum-governance that, together, create complementary 
institutional forms and social norms and values that facilitate the integration of different 
circuits of capital and the development of a workable social compromise. Christophers 
notes correctly that regulationists often neglect the role of law, litigation, and judicial 
decision-making in securing this improbable result. This deficit is unfortunate because, 
as he rightly claims, law has a key role in modulating the balance between 
simultaneous tendencies to competition and monopoly in ‘capitalist regimes of 
profitability and growth’. He then explores this topic in two steps: a theoretical account 
of the complex dialectics of competition and monopoly that frames detailed studies of 
three successive periods in the development of anti-trust law, which aims to limit 
monopoly in favour of competition, and of intellectual property rights (IPRs), which are 
intended to fashion and protect monopoly (2016: 4). 
 
For Christophers, this framing is co-constitutive of the overall argument, with the 
conceptual and historical analysis, theory and empirics, being thoroughly intertwined 
(2016: 21-22). Yet Part I’s broad analysis of competition and monopoly does not lead 
directly to the more detailed propositions and findings in Part II. In addressing this 
anomaly, I will first identify some internal theoretical problems and critique the flawed 
metaphor of balance between competition and monopoly developed in Part I. The key 
to my critique is that the world is too complex to be fully intelligible in real time, forcing 
simplifications as a way of ‘going on’ within it. In general competition occurs 
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horizontally and vertically over various sites and scales and in increasingly complex 
and fractal ways, involves changing hierarchies of markets that set the parameters of 
competition, rests on different forms of political as well as market-mediated 
competition, divides and unites capitals as ‘hostile brothers’ depending on the kinds 
and sources of competition, and has important extra-economic as well economic 
aspects (see, for example, Karuma 1973; Harvey 1982; Wheelock 1983; Perelman 
1987; Gough 1992; Moseley 2002; Jessop 2010). I then consider the case studies and 
suggest how to reconcile the broader problem of relating the dialectic between 
competition and monopoly to the empirics presented in the subsequent historical 
analysis. Specifically, I propose an alternative account that draws on cultural political 
economy and reveals more fully the significance of the case studies for differential 
accumulation (on cultural political economy, see Sum and Jessop 2013). 
 
1. The Great Leveler 
 
The book’s title refers to the always challenging and constantly changing role of the 
legal order in maintaining the right conditions for capital accumulation. Specifically, 
Christophers argues that capitalism involves a dialectical relation between competition 
and monopoly, that it requires an appropriate balance between them, that their relative 
weight changes over time in line with different capitalist regimes, that this balance is 
not always present, and that law can correct imbalances. These claims are developed 
in the first part of the text and raise problems of exegesis, eclecticism, and theoretical 
consistency. I address these issues in this section of the commentary and then, 
assuming the validity of these claims for the sake of the next step in my critique, 
question their connection in section two before offering an alternative account in the 
third section. 
 
On exegesis, Christophers argues that it is inadequate to figure competition, as he 
asserts that Marx does, as a mere passive ‘executor; of relations established 
exclusively by productive forces (2016: 105). He then suggests that this ‘productivist’ 
bias leads Marx to underplay the importance of markets, exchange relations and 
market forces. Yet Marx is quite explicit that the law of value operates through the 
allocation of capital among alternative investments in different economic spheres 
(commercial, industrial, financial, and so on) and across space-time according to 
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expectations of profit based on the anticipated difference between production prices 
and market prices. Thus the law of value already integrates circulation, distribution, 
and exchange and, a fortiori, market relations and market forces into the heart of the 
process of competition. Marx adds that it is through the configuration and operation of 
markets that surplus-value is distributed among profits of enterprise, interest, rent, 
and, one might add, IP payments (see Marx 1976a, 1976b; Mandel 1976: 41-2). 
 
Moreover, despite Christophers’s assertions, Marx does not treat competition and 
monopoly in general terms as equivalent and antithetical tendencies that should or 
could be balanced. Admittedly, there is rhetorical evidence for this in The Poverty of 
Philosophy (Marx 1976c: 195-6) and an earlier, related letter from Marx to Pavel 
Annenkov (cited by Christophers 2016: 51); Marx likewise observes in Capital that, in 
competition, one capitalist kills many (referring mainly here to the centralization of 
capital) (Marx 1976a: 714). However, Capital attends far more to competition as the 
expression of the inner nature of the capital relation than to its concentration or 
centralization. This may be because, as Marx notes, where centralization leads to 
super-profits, the law of value tends to direct capital into areas with above-average 
profits, which will then be competed away – unless natural or artificial monopolies 
exist, which will in turn create incentives to innovate to circumvent entrenched 
monopoly positions (there is an obvious overlap with Schumpeter here). Moreover, 
apart from some additions from Engels in Volume 3, Capital hardly discusses 
monopoly capital, cartels, or trusts; and, where Marx himself does discuss monopoly, 
he focuses mostly on land ownership and ground-rent and, for other types of capital, 
on technological monopolies rather than those based on organizational forms. 
 
Marx’s contributions to the study of industrial and intellectual property are largely 
ignored here as elsewhere. Yet he had a sophisticated account of their contradictory 
role in accumulation, especially in the equalization of profit rates among different kinds 
of capital producing different kinds of material and immaterial commodities and in the 
facilitation of super-profits deriving from IP-based rents. The balance between these 
effects depends once again on the operation of the law of value (for a reconstruction 
and extension, see Jessop 2004). 
 
I emphasize these points not just for the sake of exegetical accuracy but because, if 
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one takes Marx seriously (as Christophers does), the law of value is an important 
entry-point for analysing the dialectic of competition and monopoly, the context in 
which the state and law operate, and some potential limitations of juridico-political 
intervention in facilitating capital accumulation. This should be included among the 
‘conceptual first principles’ (2016: 267) that organize and explain the case studies. 
Yet, after a brief appearance in Part I, it no longer figures in The Great Leveler and is 
replaced by comparative economic history and narrative policy analysis and general 
assertions about imbalances between competition and monopoly in different periods. 
 
Another set of theoretical problems is rooted in the eclectic range of orthodox and 
heterodox sources employed in the account of competition and monopoly. Because 
these sources advance different analyses of competition and monopoly, their dynamic 
and articulation, and their consequences, this reinforces the theoretical problem of 
establishing the ‘right’ balance between them as a basis for undertaking historical 
research. Thus it is no surprise that Christophers does not provide an index of balance 
for capitalism as a whole or an indication of the spatiotemporal horizons over which it 
is to be judged (whether ‘objectively’ or in a court of law). Of course, this may be 
irrelevant in the real world, where other theoretical and policy paradigms and related 
economic imaginaries may be in play. But such a response would call into question 
the intertwining of the conceptual and historical analysis, theory and empirics. A 
potential post-hoc functionalist escape route here is the suggestion that serious 
imbalances are revealed in and through crises and that the law (anti-trust, IP, or both) 
is then mobilized to successfully restore the balance in line with the revealed needs of 
capital in a given crisis conjuncture (Christophers 2016: 21ff). 
 
This suggestion is also problematic. First, the crises mentioned in Part II are particular 
events (such as ‘Black Tuesday’ on 29 October 1929) but protracted periods marked 
by allegedly pathological symptoms (such as the ‘First Great Depression’), widespread 
worries about the future effects of currently perceived imbalances (excessive 
monopoly power after 1945), or signs of declining national competitiveness (for 
example, the US economy from the 1980s onwards). Second, not only might one 
contest the depiction of these protracted periods as ‘crises’ but, if this portrayal were 
conceded, one would still face serious challenges in retroducing underlying causes 
and, hence, of knowing how to address them (on this topic, see Jessop 2015). Third, 
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as the case studies show, competition and IP law also fail in crucial respects and, 
hence, there is no guarantee that they can serve the functions attributed to them alone, 
in combination, or in conjunction with yet other measures. 
 
2. The Limits of Law in Regulating Competition and Monopoly 
 
In Marxian terms, one rationale for attempts to rebalance monopoly and competition 
concerns a tension between (1) the interests of particular capitals in securing above 
average rates of profit at the expense of other capitals by engaging in anti-competitive 
forms of competition, such as through cartels or monopolies, and (2) the interest of 
capital in general in securing the free play of market forces so that no particular capitals 
are disadvantaged (cf. Christophers 2016: 167). This also holds for IPRs (cf. 
Christophers 2016: 111-18, 134). It is such tensions that competition and IP law are 
expected (cognitively or normatively) to resolve in different ways with important path-
dependent contrasts between US anti-trust law and Continental European competition 
law and different attitudes towards intellectual property in advanced and developing 
economies (cf. Christophers 2016: 144-5). 
 
While, following the work of Marx and Schumpeter, Christophers notes that 
competition promotes monopoly and creative destruction, in contrast to these authors 
he focuses on competition in market price formation and exchange relations. This 
sidelines the broader operation of the law of value and, for Schumpeter, the role of 
long wave dynamics in transforming growth regimes. This focus on market prices 
reflects the concerns of classical political economy and the neo-classical tradition as 
well as legal scholarship and practice. The result is to underplay theoretically and 
empirically the limits of competition law in regulating the balance between competition 
and monopoly. It is easier to regulate monopolies and anti-competitive competition in 
market exchange (manipulating market prices) than it is to regulate anti-competitive 
competition in the productive sphere that is grounded in, for example, technological 
monopolies or innovation (Jessop 2013). Indeed, where competitiveness stems from 
more effective capacities to reduce socially necessary labour times, turnover times 
and the times of natural reproduction, it can generate super-profits for a time even 
when commodities are sold at or below ‘normal’ market prices. This is more likely 
during intense periods of creative destruction (Schumpeter 1962). Such transitions 
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tend to disrupt competition law, which lags behind changes in products, processes, 
marketing, sourcing, and corporate organization. In addition, many kinds of 
competitive and anti-competitive behavior remain beyond the reach of competition law 
because they are beyond its remit (e.g., non-tariff trade barriers or the activities of the 
competition state) and this, in turn, sets limits to the capacity of law to find the right 
balance between monopoly and competition in price formation. 
 
Christophers presents a stronger case for getting the competition-monopoly balance 
right in the field of IPRs as an aspect of market power. Yet this has ‘ineluctable 
implications for the productive sphere given the aforementioned “dynamic totality” 
nature of capital’ (2016: 113). But he also shows that this balance mainly concerns 
that between monopoly (hoarding) and dissemination rather than between monopoly 
and competition (2016: 111-12, 269-70). Once again this indicates the complexities of 
the dialectic between competition and monopoly and its analytical challenges. 
 
3. A Cultural Political Economy Perspective 
 
The complexities of capital accumulation on a world scale are so great that an 
‘appropriate balance’ between competition and monopoly is unknowable even with 
hindsight, especially given the problem of counterfactuals. This is problematic even 
for the balance between competition law and IPR law, let alone for the overall balance 
between competition and monopoly in all their diverse, dialectically intertwined, and 
often only analytically separable, forms .Indeed, even the notion of balance is 
misleading insofar as it implies an equilibrium or equilibration process between two 
opposing forces (the same holds for the author’s metaphor of a legal pendulum 
swinging too far to one side or another before coming to a temporary rest) 
(Christophers 2016: 214, 244). This means that any judgement on how to strike the 
right balance between competition and monopoly (or their legal aspects) and their 
proper place in accumulation, the distribution of profits, and growth dynamics will 
depend on socially constructed imaginaries rather than some objective criterion. 
 
These imaginaries vary with competing economic, political, legal and social 
imaginaries and any corresponding policy paradigms. They also vary with the interests 
and perspectives of different capitals and fractions, the changing balance between 
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capital and labour, the preferences of rival political forces, and competing traditions 
and schools of economics and law. Among the main forces involved in such efforts 
identified in The Great Leveler are: powerful business interests, small business, 
farmers, organized labour, consumers, economists, academic lawyers, the judiciary, 
the state, international economic agencies such as the WTO (via TRIPS), the press, 
social and political currents such as the Progressive movement, and neoliberal think 
tanks such as the Mont Pelerin Society. Other influences are fundamental legal-
philosophical paradigms, economic and legal doctrines, intellectual sea changes, 
protectionism, laissez-faire, military contingencies, war-time patriotism, and shared 
class values. This opens space for a great deal of contingency. Yet the resulting laws, 
judicial decisions, legal innovations, and legal practices cannot be purely ‘arbitrary, 
rationalistic and willed’ (Gramsci 1971: 376-7) if they are to secure the right balance 
between competition and monopoly for ‘healthy’ (sic) accumulation or restore it in the 
face of acute or chronic crises. On the contrary, they must have some significant, albeit 
necessarily partial, correspondence to real material interdependencies in the actually 
existing economy and/or in relations between economic and extra-economic activities. 
 
Thus an alternative entry-point is to ask why some imaginaries and paradigms come 
to be selected in a specific conjuncture, get translated into law and judicial decisions 
or state interventions, and why some of these work well enough to support the next 
stage of expansion before new tensions, conflicts, and crises indicate a need for a 
new balance. This requires attention to the various mechanisms that operate to select 
and retain some economic and legal imaginaries, some sets of economic interests, 
some crisis diagnoses, and some policy paradigms rather than others. We need more 
detailed analyses about which construals regarding the right balance between 
competition and monopoly were excluded, which policies were then tried and failed, 
and about the constitutive or performative effects of legal solutions. Relevant to this 
process of variation, selection and retention are discursive, structural, technological 
(in the Foucauldian sense of governmentality), and agential mechanisms (Sum and 
Jessop 2013). Such analyses may also help to explain the differences between the 
United Kingdom and United States, the leads and lags between economic and legal 
development during prolonged crises and transition periods, and the changing scales 
and scope of legal regulation and the governance of monopoly and competition. Many 
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of these intertwined issues surface in the case studies and invite further theoretical 




It should be evident from this and other contributions to this symposium that Brett 
Christophers has produced a well-researched and provocative book that identifies a 
major gap in heterodox political economy and synthesizes a huge amount of 
theoretical and historical material. I will not repeat my criticisms here. Instead I suggest 
that a more appropriate metaphor than the (im)balance between two opposing forces 
might be a parallelogram of multiple causal mechanisms and counter-mechanisms, 
tendencies and counter-tendencies, that develop unevenly in space-time and present 
different challenges at different moments for different agents such that there is no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ best solution, let alone a stable, if temporary, point of rest. In turn, this 
suggests a much more complex process than equilibration, namely, collibration, which 
involves the continuing trial-and-error task of governing this changing parallelogram of 
forces through diverse strategies and mechanisms. Law, litigation, and judicial 
decision-making would then become part of a repertoire of resources and their role in 
competing efforts at collibration would be seen as contested and contingent rather 
than governed quasi-teleologically by the ‘needs’ of capital for the right balance 
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